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of the individual man in the natural order "fairly raises the presumption that his place in nature has a meaning that is not to be measured by the length of his life in the body." Looking at the work critically, the main objection to be noted is that the author fails to furnish us with a really clear conception of what constitutes the individual and of what distinguishes him as such from other individuals—a deficiency which is not altogether excused by the assumption of a purely scientific point of view. On the other hand, the simplicity of the style and the many new and original points of view from which the subject is treated make the work as a whole one of unusual attractiveness and interest.

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THE NEW WORLD AND THE NEW THOUGHT. By JAMES THOMPSON BIXBY. New York: T. Whittaker, 1901. Pp. 219. \$1.

The purpose of the author, who is evidently a theistic evolutionist, as in his previous volume, entitled *Religion and Science as Allies*, is to promote this alliance. He holds that the vastness of the universe, as disclosed by modern science, does not indicate the insignificance of man, but his greatness, since evolution proves that he is "the end and aim of creation"—"the head of the kingdom of life." He claims, in opposition to Huxley, that evolutionary processes, if traced far enough, disclose a moral purpose and tendency; and, in antagonism with Tyndall and Spencer, he claims that God is knowable by man, and that our religious instincts and intuitions are trustworthy.

Evolution being defined as God's method of working, an alliance between evolution and Christianity needs only a correct conception of Christianity, and this, our author believes, is furnished by the higher criticism. Some things said by the author seem to indicate his rejection of the Bible miracles; but he says: "The only miracles which even religion today should know are those wonders . . . that present examples of subtler and deeper laws than we are acquainted with." Since what we call natural laws are only what we know of God's method of working, and since it would be absurd to assume that men have discovered all God's methods, we may be sure that there are such "subtler and deeper laws," with which the Bible miracles may be in perfect harmony. The believer in miracles needs to claim no more.

The style of the author's criticisms of the Old Testament provokes the suspicion that he has not given to it the candid and independent study which its acknowledged superiority to all other literature and his own avowed purpose warrant us in expecting, but has accepted the dicta of the radical critics with little acquaintance with the arguments of conservative scholars.

The counsel given in the chapter on modern dogmatism is good; but it is a two-edged sword, for there is dogmatism in radicalism as well as in conservatism.

N. S. Burton.

ANN ARBOR, MICH.

Das Ding an sich und das Naturgesetz der Seele. Eine neue Erkenntnistheorie. Von Ernst Fr. Wyneken. Heidelberg: Winter, 1901. Pp. xvi + 446. M. 15.

This work is partly an interpretation, partly a modification, of Kant's theory of knowledge. We remember the general uncertainty of Kant's attitude toward the thing in itself; sometimes, by affirming merely that we can know nothing of its character, he seems to imply its existence, while again he seems to affirm that nothing exists beyond the world of phenomena. The object of the work before us is to show both that the thing in itself exists and that we have a positive basis for a statement of its character. This basis is to be found in our selfconsciousness. For there we have a real experience both of the thing in itself — the soul or ego — and of its external phenomena. What we find in ourselves we may then infer of the other objects which we know through phenomena only. Their underlying substance and reality must be the same as our own, which is the only form of reality with which we are acquainted or which is ultimately conceivable. Accordingly, the principle underlying the world as a whole must be the conscious principle. Here we have the meaning of the author's title, "The Thing in Itself and the Natural Law of the Soul." But his argument, unlike that of most forms of idealistic philosophy, does not bring him merely to a universal world-soul. On the contrary, from the nature of our individual consciousness, he infers that other objects must, like ourselves, be the expression of individual souls. He thus conceives of the world, after the manner of Leibniz, as an aggregate of monads, or conscious elements, whose interaction results in the phenomena found in experience. Having outlined his hypothesis, he proceeds to apply it in detail to the various problems of science and metaphysics. He seeks to show, in the first place, that it is the hypothesis toward which men are tending in all of the recent philos-